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ABSTRACT 
The role of the audit committee continues to be of importance to 
regulators. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) co-sponsored a Blue 
Ribbon Committee (BRC) to make recommendations for improving 
the effectiveness of the audit committee. In Indonesia, the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange (JSX) issued a regulation in 2001. The regulation 
emphasize all companies (which treaded publicly) must have audit 
committee. On the basis of the regulation, existing audit committee is 
expected to be able to restrict earnings management. According to 
Millstein (1999), it is totally consistent that good corporate governance 
practice points to the audit committee as the focal point for 
improvement in financial statements. This study investigates whether 
audit committee formation can reduce earnings management. Data is 
collected from JSX in 2001 and 2002 for manufacturing companies. 
Using independent sample t-test, the result suggests that audit 
committee can reduce earnings management.  
 
Key words: Audit Committee, Earnings Management, Good 
Corporate Governance. 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
Peran komite audit terus menjadi penting untuk regulator. The New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) dan National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) disponsori Komite Ribbon Biru (BRC) untuk 
membuat rekomendasi untuk meningkatkan efektivitas komite audit.  
Di Indonesia, Bursa Efek Jakarta (BEJ) mengeluarkan peraturan pada 
tahun 2001. Peraturan tersebut menekankan semua perusahaan (yang 
publik) harus memiliki komite audit. Atas dasar peraturan, komite 
audit yang ada diharapkan dapat membatasi manajemen laba. 
Menurut Millstein (1999), itu benar-benar konsisten yang baik praktik 
tata kelola perusahaan yang menunjuk ke komite audit sebagai titik 
fokus untuk perbaikan dalam laporan keuangan. Studi ini meneliti 
apakah pembentukan komite audit dapat mengurangi manajemen 
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laba. Data dikumpulkan dari BEJ pada tahun 2001 dan 2002 untuk 
perusahaan manufaktur. Menggunakan sample t-test independent, 
hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa komite audit dapat mengurangi 
manajemen laba. 
 
Kata kunci: Komite Audit, Manajemen Laba, Tata Kelola Perusahaan 
yang Baik. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the important issues in good corporate governance is whether 
audit committee can restrict earnings management. This issue has been 
widely discussed in the characteristic context functions of board of directors 
and audit committee. Klein (2002) finds that there is a negative relation 
between board of directors and independence of audit committee and 
abnormal accruals. Similarly, Peasnell et al. (2000) suggest that boards 
(outside board members and audit committee) contribute towards the 
integrity of financial statement, as predicted by agency theory. Chtourou et 
al. (2001) provides evidence that effective boards and audit committee 
constrain earnings management activities. Xie et al. (2001) finds that board 
and audit committee activity and their members’ financial sophistication 
may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to 
engage in earnings management.  
According to Baridwan (2002), audit committee has an important role 
in good corporate governance. According to Millstein (1999) practice of 
good corporate governance points to the audit committee as the focal point 
for improvement quality of financial reporting. Bapepam (2001) also 
emphasizes that audit committee helps the board of commissioner to 
control operation of the firm. 
On December 1999, NYSE and NASDAQ modified regulation about 
audit committee. The regulation requires audit committee should consist of 
independent directors, have at least three financially literate directors with 
knowledge in accounting and/or finance at least one member of audit 
committee. The regulation is based on advocates of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees. The committee recommends strengthening the role of audit 
committee in overseeing the process of the financial reporting. There are 
ten recommendations categorized to five groups as the independence of the 
audit committee members, financial literacy, audit committee structure, the 
independent issues of outside auditors, and quality of accounting principles. 
The recommendation had been researched by Kalber (1992), Kalbers 
and Fogarty (1993), McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), Collier and 
Gregory (1998), Abbott and Parker (2000), Carcello and Neal (2000), 
Beasley and Salterio (2001), DeZoort and Salterio (2001), Raghunandan et 
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al. (2001), Klein (2002a), Fleming (2002), Landes (2002). The researchers 
find that audit committee should be independent, with accounting and 
finance knowledge, regularly meet with management, internal and external 
auditor to increase its effectiveness. 
In Indonesia, JSX issued a regulation requiring all companies must 
have audit committee (BEJ, 2001). Based on the regulation, existent of audit 
committee is expected to be able to prevent earnings management activities. 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management is motivated 
by several factors such as capital market, contract, and regulation. Perry and 
Williams (1994), Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), Rangan (1998), 
and Erickson and Wang (1998) find that earnings management is motivated 
by capital market. Healy (1985), Holthausen et al. (1995), Gaver et al. 
(1995), and Guidry et al. (1998) find that earnings management is done to 
contract and compensation motivation. Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), Na’im 
and Hartono (1996), Key (1997), and Navissi (1999) find that earnings 
management is done to antitrust and for regulation. In Indonesia, Saiful 
(2000), Sutanto (2000), Sulistyanto (2002), and Santioso (2002) find that 
there is earnings management done by firms especially in JSX.  Based on 
empirical results, the objective of this study is to investigate whether audit 
committee can reduce earnings management.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
Financial Statement 
SFAC No. 1 emphasizes that the general purpose of financial 
statement is to give information in decision making. SFAC No. 2 deals with 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information. The qualitative is 
relevance (predictive value, feedback value, and timeliness) and reliability 
(verifiability and representational faithfulness) (see Wolk et al. 2000). 
 
Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define relationship between principle and 
agent in the company. The principle delegates some authority for agent to 
make decision in using company resources.  If each party maximize their 
utilities, there is a reason that agent will not always act to principle interest. 
Therefore, there is an agency conflict between principle and agent. 
 
Audit Committee 
On July 20, 2001, public companies are required to form audit 
committee to implement good corporate governance. The members of the 
audit committee are at least three persons from outside firm 
(independence). One among three persons is an independent board of 
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commissioner that also as the chairman of audit committee. At least one of 
the members has knowledge in accounting and/or finance.  
Independence of Audit Committee 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) find the legitimate factors and independence of 
audit committee members in terms of organizational power, formal, written 
authority coupled with observable support from top management play the 
most important roles in audit committee power as it relates to effectiveness.  
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) find that companies with financial 
reporting problems; only 67% had audit committees composed of outside 
directors. In contrast, the companies without financial statement problems, 
86% had audit committees of solely outside directors. 
Abbott and Parker (2000) find that firms with audit committee that do not 
include employees and meet at least twice per year are more likely to use 
auditor specialists. Carcello and Neal (2000) have shown that more 
percentage of affiliated directors on audit committee, the lower the 
probability the auditor will issue going-concern report. Beasley and Salterio 
(2001) suggest that Canadian firms voluntarily include more outside 
directors on audit committee than the mandated minimum have larger 
boards with more outsiders serving on those boards and are more likely to 
segregate the board chairperson position from the CEO/president positions. 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) find that the more independent director in 
audit committee member, the greater their support independent auditor 
advocating a substance over form approaches. Conversely, the more a 
senior member of management in audit committee more support 
management. 
Klein (2002a) has shown that audit committee independence is associated 
with economic factors. He also finds those audit committee independence 
increases with board size and board independence and decrease with the 
firm’s growth opportunities and for firms that report consecutive losses.  
 
Experience and Knowledge in Accounting and Finance 
According to Kalbers (1992), training of audit committee on auditing, 
accounting, and internal control issues can play an important role in helping 
audit committees meet their responsibilities.  Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) 
find only one direct link between expert power and effectiveness. Expert 
power is highly associated with financial reporting effectiveness.  
McMullen and Raghundandan (1996) show the companies with financial 
reporting problems; only 6% has an audit committee with at least one CPA. 
In contrast, the companies without problems, 25% has audit committees 
with at least one CPA. According to Fleming (2002), audit committee 
responsibilities must include the tasks ensuring practices of financial 
reporting are true. 
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Meeting with Management and Internal Auditor 
According to Kalbers (1992), audit committees must communicate their 
intention to carry out their responsibilities to management and auditors. 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) find that audit committees of problem 
companies were less likely to have frequent meetings. Only twenty three 
percent of audit committees of problem companies have regularly 
scheduled meetings three or more times a year. Forty percent of audit 
committees of companies without financial reporting problems met at least 
three times annually.  
According to Fleming (2002), audit committee members should spend 
considerable periods of time at the company when performing audit 
committee duties. Meeting should not be limited to just three or four times 
a year depend on the size and risks associated with a company. Audit 
committee members should be expected to spend 100 to 300 hours a year 
company performing audit committee oversight.  
 
Definition of Earnings Management 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs 
when manager uses a judgment on financial report and structuring 
transactions. The purpose of earnings management is to mislead 
stakeholder on performance of the firm or to influence contractual. Scott 
(2000) explained that earnings management is the choice of accounting 
policies by manager to achieve some specific objective. 
 
Motivation for Earnings Management 
According to Scott (2000), earnings management is done to achieve 
bonus purposes, other contractual, political, taxation, changes of CEO, 
initial public offerings, and to communicate information to investors.  
Earnings Management for Bonus Purposes 
Bonus plan hypothesis is ceteris paribus; managers of firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). Healy (1985) find that changes in accounting procedures by 
managers is related to adoption or modification of their bonus.  Guidry et 
al. (1999) find that business-unit managers manipulate earnings to maximize 
their short-term bonus plan. Gaver et al. (1995) find that when earnings 
before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound, managers select 
income-increasing discretionary accruals.  Holthausen et al. (1995) 
document that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their 
bonuses are at the maximum bound.  
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The Other Contractual Motivations 
The objective of earnings management to credit contract is explained by 
debt/equity hypothesis in positive accounting theory. Debt/equity hypothesis 
is ceteris paribus; the larger a firm’s debt/equity ratio, the more likely the 
firm’s manager is to select accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to current period (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). Sweeny (1994) finds that firms managers approaching default 
respond with income-increasing accounting changes and that the default 
costs imposed by lenders and the accounting flexibility available to 
managers are important determines by managers accounting responses.  
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that in the year prior to covenant 
violation, abnormal accruals are positive significantly.  
 
Political Motivations 
Jones (1991) finds that managers decrease earnings through earnings 
management during import relief investigations. Cahan (1992) supports the 
political-cost hypothesis. The result of his study is consistent with the view 
that managers adjust earnings in response to monopoly-related antitrust 
investigations.  Na’im and Hartono (1996) support the political cost 
hypothesis for manufacturing firms. Key (1997) also supported political cost 
hypothesis. Navissi (1999) provides evidence of income decreasing 
discretionary accruals by manufacturing firms for the years during which 
they could apply for price increases.  
 
Taxation Motivations 
In U.S.A., firms using LIFO method for inventories having tax as a purpose 
have to use the method in financial reporting. The firms can use LIFO 
method to decrease earnings. Management also can use FIFO method to 
increase earnings. Dopuch and Pincus (1988) find that there is relationship 
between economizing tax and choosing accounting method to valuing 
inventories.  In Indonesia, Santioso (2002) finds that discretionary accrual is 
greater when there is a change in regulation.  
 
Changes of CEO 
DeFond and Park (1997) find that job safety is an incentive for management 
to conduct income smoothing either current or future job position.  
 
Capital Market Hypothesis 
Perry and Williams (1994) provide evidence of discretionary accruals 
manipulation in the predicted direction in the year preceding the public 
announcement of management’s intention to bid for control of the 
company. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that firms manage reported 
earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Teoh et al. (1998a) find that 
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issuers who adjust discretionary current accruals to report higher net income 
prior to the offering have lower abnormal stock returns and net income in 
the long run. Teoh et al. (1998b) find that issuers report greater net income 
in prospectus than before IPO.   
Rangan (1998) finds that the stock market temporarily overvalues issuing 
firms and is subsequently disappointed by predictable declines in earnings 
caused by earnings management. Erickson and Wang (1999) find that 
acquiring firms manage earnings upward in the periods before merger 
agreement. Kiswara (1999) finds that there is earnings management caused 
by industrial classification. Saiful (2002) finds earnings management occurs 
during the year around the initial public offerings (IPO).  Sulistyanto (2002) 
finds that the firms do earnings management opportunistic when they do 
the IPO. 
 
Audit Committee and Earnings Management 
Peasnell et al. (2000) show that the likelihood of managers making 
income increasing accruals to avoid reporting both losses and earnings 
reduction is negatively related to proportion of outsiders on the board.  
Chtourou et al. (2001) find that earnings management is significantly 
associated with some practices of the governance practice by audit 
committees and boards of directors. Xie et al. (2001) support the Blue 
Ribbon Panel recommendation indicating that a lower level of earnings 
management is associated with greater independent outside representation 
on the board. Xie et al. also found that the presence of corporate executives 
and investment bankers on audit committee associate with a reducing 
practice of earnings management. Klein (2002b) finds a negative association 
between abnormal accruals and the percent of outside directors on the audit 
committee.  
 Based on discussion from normative theory (SFAC No. 1 and 2), 
agency theory, and the empirical results, this study presents alternative 
hypotheses as follows. 
H1: Discretionary accruals between before and after formed audit 
committee are different. 
H2:  Discretionary accruals between and after formed audit committee that 
is eligible to JSX standard are different. 
H3:  Discretionary accruals between and after formed audit committee that 
is ineligible to JSX standard are different. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample Selection 
This study uses the population of all firms listed in JSX that announce 
financial statement during 1999-2002. The sample selection uses purposive 
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sampling method. There are some criteria of the sample. First, firms 
announce audited financial statement during 1999-2002 with a December 
31 accounting period. Second, the firms report the formation of audit 
committee to JSX, and then JSX report the firms that their audit committee 
is eligible and ineligible to JSX standard. 
Based on the criteria above 136 samples is collected from 
manufacturing companies during 1999-2002 in Table 1.  
 2001 2002 Total 
Sample to measure total accrual, discretionary 
accrual, non discretionary accrual to 
manufacturing industry 
 
136 
 
136 
 
270 
From 136 firms, they  formed audit committee 49 44 93 
Audit committee is eligible to JSX standard 44 41 85 
Audit committee is ineligible to JSX standard 5 3 8 
 
 
Data Collection 
The data is obtained from the Jakarta Stock Exchange (www.jsx.co.id), 
Pojok Galeri Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Atma Jaya Yogyakarta, and  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory. 
 
Model Formulation 
This study uses Jones’ model (1991). The model is as follows. 
TAit/A it-1 = 1 (1/Ait-1) + 2 (Revit/Ait-1) + 3 (PPEit/Ait-1) + it  (1) 
Where TAit is total discretionary accruals firm i period t (difference 
between net income before extraordinary, discontinued operation, and 
changing of accounting policy and cash flow from operation). A it-1 is total 
active firm i period t-1.  Revit is chancing revenue firm i period t 
(difference between current revenue and previous revenue).  PPEit is fixed 
assets firm i period t-1. it is error term firm i period t. 
NDAit = 1 (1/A it-1) + 2 (Revt/A it-1) + 3 (PPEt/A it-1)    (2) 
DAit = TA it/A it-1 – [1 (1/A it-1) + 2 (Revt/A it-1) + 3 (PPEt/A it-1)]  (3) 
From formula above, NDA is non-discretionary accrual. DA is 
discretionary accruals. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 
To test hypothesis H1, H2, and H3, this study uses paired sample test 
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test.  
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Test Difference of Discretionary Accruals  
The result of examining hypothesis one, two, and three is presented in 
Table 2 
 Compan
y 
forming 
the audit 
committe
e in 2001 
Column_
A 
Compan
y 
forming 
the audit 
committ
ee in 
2002 
Column
_B 
Compan
y 
forming 
the audit 
committ
ee in 
2001acc
ordingto 
the 
standard 
Column
_C 
Compan
y 
forming 
the audit 
committ
ee in 
2002 
accordin
g to the 
standard 
Column
_D 
Company 
forming 
the audit 
committee 
in 2001 
not 
according 
to the 
standard 
Column_
E 
Company 
forming the 
audit 
committee 
in 2002 not 
according 
to the 
standard 
Column_F 
Mean 
discreti
onary 
accruals 
t-1 
0.1345 0.1431 0.1339 0.1441   
Mean 
discreti
onary 
accruals 
t 
0.1243 0.1025 0.1214 0.1044   
discreti
onary 
accruals  
1.018E-
02 
4.059E-
02 
1.248E-
02 
3.971E-
02 
1.75 
(negative) 
3.83 
(positive) 
3 (negative) 
1.50 
(positive) 
t-test 0.391 2.231 0.432 2.063   
z-test     -1.084 0 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
    0.279 1 
 
Mean differentiation in Table 2-column_A indicates that the firms 
forming audit committee has smaller discretionary accruals after forming an 
audit committee. After measuring mean from two groups, this study does a 
test to show whether the different of the mean is statistically significant. The 
result in Table 2-column_B reports the difference of the mean is not 
significant statistically. It may be caused by companies that forms audit 
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committee at the end of 2001. Therefore, audit committee has shorter 
working period.  
This study will conduct a mean test for firms forming audit committee 
in 2002, but have not yet formed the audit committee in 2001. There are 44 
companies that forms audit committee in 2002. The result in Table 2-
column_B shows that mean of discretionary accruals is different. This study 
will test compare means using paired samples test. The result in Table 2-
column_B shows the difference of the mean discretionary accruals for the 
audit committee formed in 2002 is significant statistically at alpha 5%.  
The different results between audit committee formed in 2001 and 
2002 possibly due to working period of audit committee in 2001 is shorter 
than 2002. Lot of company formed the audit committee during November 
and December 2001. Audit committee formed in 2002, working period is 
longer because many of companies form audit committee in the early until 
in the middle of 2002. Based on the result, alternative hypothesis (H1) is 
partially supported and consistent with previous research as Peasnell et al. 
(2000), Chtourou et al. (2001), Xie Te al. (2001), and Klein (2002b).  
There are 44 companies which have an audit committee that was 
eligible to JSX standard for companies forming audit committee in 2001. 
The result of the paired samples statistic test is shown in Table 2-column_C, 
indicates mean difference after forming audit committee of the amount of 
discretionary accruals become smaller. This study conducts a two mean 
discretionary accruals test to know whether this difference is statistically 
significant. The result in Table 2-column_C shows that is not significant 
statistically.  
This study compare mean of discretionary accruals of 41 companies, 
which was eligible to JSX standard in 2002. The result in Table 2-
column_D shows a difference in mean between before and after the 
formation of the audit committee. This study will test the difference of two 
means (2001-2002) by paired samples test. The result in Table 2-column_D 
indicates difference of mean between before and after the audit committee 
formation in 2002 that is significant statistically at alpha 5%. It shows 
performance of audit committee formed in 2002 is better than in 2001. The 
result partially supports the hypothesis H2. 
This study uses JSX announcement clarifying firm’s audit committee is 
ineligible to the JSX standard on February 18, 2002, August 8, 2002, and 
January 29, 2003. For the companies forming audit committee in 2001, 
there are five firms which audit committee is ineligible to JSX standard. For 
the examination of hypothesis H3, this study uses non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test to examine difference of mean between before and after 
formation audit committee. Table 2-column_E presents discretionary 
accruals between before and after the formation of the audit committee for 
2001 is 1.75 (negative ranks) and 3.83 (positive ranks). Afterwards, this 
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study will test the difference of the two discretionary accruals above by 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Z table at alpha 5% is equal to - 1,645. Z test is 
equal to - 1,084. The result in Table 2-column_E indicates that 
discretionary accruals between before and after the formation of the audit 
committee is not different statistically.  
In 2002, there are three companies which audit committee is ineligible 
to JSX standard. Table 2-column_F presents discretionary accruals between 
before and after formation of audit committee is 3 (negative ranks) and 1.50 
(positive ranks). Next, this study will test the different of two discretionary 
accruals above by Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The result presents that Z 
table at alpha 5% is equal to - 1,645. Z test is equal to 0. The result in Table 
2-column_F indicates those discretionary accruals between before and after 
the formation of the audit committee is not statistically different.  Therefore, 
hypothesis three (H3) is not supported.  
This result may be caused by membership of audit committee, which 
does not meet standard requirements. For example, two members of audit 
committee representing commissioner of company are internal party of the 
company. The members of the audit committee are less than three people. 
There are non-independent commissaries as a committee chief of the audit 
committee.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Findings from this research conclude that decline of accrual 
discretionary in year 2001 is not statistically significant, while the decline of 
accrual discretionary is statistically significant when audit committee was 
formed in the year 2002. Based on the result, this study concludes that there 
is an important role of the audit committee to oversee the board of directors 
in running its duty and oversee the compilation of the financial statement so 
this report submits more reliable information in companies.  
These results also show that there is a role in audit committee to 
reduce earnings management which is shown by a decline in accrual 
discretionary when there is audit committee. The same result also shown for 
eligible audit committee to JSX standard. Audit committee formed in the 
year 2001 has worse performance than audit committee formed in the year 
2002. For ineligible audit committee, it has bad performance both formed 
in 2001 and 2002.  
This research has some limitation.  Motivation of earnings 
management is randomly done.  Second, a period formation of audit 
committee is limited to year 2001 and 2002. Future research can improve 
this research weakness. Adding the period of time can do future research. 
Also, future research can compare the performance of the audit committee 
between more regulated industry and less regulated industry.  
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